麻豆AV

Introduction

The role of social and ethical values in accepting scientific hypotheses has long been recognized. As Rudner (1953) observes, 鈥渉ow sure we need to be before we accept a hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake would be鈥�. Values play a role whenever the hypothesis under consideration has practical or ethical consequences. Despite this, discussions aimed at evaluating scientific evidence often fail to take these values into account. This is particularly true in comparative psychology, which is surprising, given the vast implications that accepting or rejecting hypotheses in this field might have 鈥� hypotheses such as whether fish feel pain or chimpanzees have self-awareness. In this talk, I argue for the importance of social and ethical values in evaluating claims about animal cognition. Taking these values into account reveals that the consequences of false negatives are worse than traditionally conceived

Speakers

• Dr Marta Halina Dept of History & Philosophy of Science, Cambridge Uni, United Kingdom

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Venue

University of Cambridge

Pfizer lecture theatre, University of Cambridge, Department of Chemistry, Lensfield Rd, Cambridge, CB2 1EW, United Kingdom

Useful links

Committee

• John O'Toole Honorary Secretary/Treasurer, United Kingdom

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Organised by

麻豆AV Mid-Anglia Section
SCI Cambridge and Great Eastern Section

Contact information

John O'Toole
麻豆AV Mid-Anglia
07777 653934
Contact us by email

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